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Political culture of post-soviet
economic change:
the case of financial-industrial groups
J E F F R E Y K. H A S S

∏
Beneath the seeming chaos and conflict of Russia’s post-socialist experience were structured dynamics of contentious reconstruction of
fields (collective relations of power and culture institutionalized as
authority and definitions of “normal”). This essay argues that the
Russian experience was driven in no small part by contention over
remaking core meanings and authority of field relations, practices,
and boundaries. Contention over field reconstruction emerged as
three groups’ interests and taken-for granted meanings of normality collided: those of Soviet-era managers, a new class of financial
entrepreneurs and elites, and state elites and officials. Post-socialism has been a story of competing elite culture as well as interests.
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F I N D I N G T H E LO G I C O F E C O NO M I C C H A N G E :
C U LT U R E A N D F I E L D S

Since 1989 East Europe and the former USSR have witnessed historic post-socialist market-building. Alas, twenty years on we still
inadequately understand dynamics of these economic revolutions
(especially power and culture). Many studies have focused more on
correlation in outcomes rather than causation (e. g. Eyal et al. 2001;
Iankova 2002; Gerber and Hout 1998). Alternatively, social dynamics of post-socialist economic change are assumed: analyses focus
on institutions and elite coalitions, while presuming that individual
rational action is the engine of strategic and practice (e. g. among
others: Åslund 1995; Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Earle 1993; Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994; Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski 2000; Gaddy and Ickes 2002). Understand the institutions
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(laws, organizational procedures, etc.) and political alliances, and,
following the principles of rational choice (utility maximization or
optimization), you understand (supposedly) why things happen.
Yet such analyses, so plentiful in economics and political science,
do not always rise to the challenge of making sense of such complex and grand events as Russia’s post-socialist, post-Soviet experience. This is unfortunate, given that market-building in transitional economies provides a glimpse into the dynamics of the birth
of capitalism, e. g. alteration of social practices, the rise of classes,
and the imposition of new economic logics in the face of tradition.
In particular, there has been little direct attention to dynamics of
power and culture and their coalescence into emergent properties
(but see Kennedy 2002). The meaning of categories, which structure social action (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967), are the meat of
post-socialist transitions; only a critical sociology aware of this can
begin to approach cultural and power dynamics of market-building.
Yet a growing number of non-economists, and a minority of
economists, accept that economies are stranger than mainstream
theory suggests. Neoliberal theory assumes efficiency and a natural evolutionary selection process where the fit survive and the
unfit fail. This may be true in some contexts but is far from satisfactory as a general model, especially for post-socialist transitions—no surprise, as efficiency theory does not explain the rise of
the corporation in its birthplace, the United States (Roy 1997). Efficiency theory assumes the rule of law and state capacity to support property rights and market rules. Costs and calculation are
assumed to be objective. Actors assess existing costs, benefits, opportunities, and dangers, and they then address existing rules as
they see fit. Mechanisms of change and reproduction remain surface manifestations of deeper, multidimensional change processes that remain in a black box. Even explanations that introduce
institutions (e. g. laws or formal rules) eventually run into problems. High taxes, legal barriers, weak infrastructure, a state “captured” by social classes to support rent-seeking, or weak contract
law are invoked to explain problems of economic growth or restructuring (cf. Schüsselbauer 1999; Hellman and Schankerman
2000; Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 1999, 2000). Weak institutions, or weak state enforcement of capitalist laws, is a main culprit here. Yet this instrumental approach to institutions—where
institutions (rules and procedures) affect action by shaping costs
and benefits—is too simple (Woodruff 2000). Institutions are invoked—but what are these, and how do they operate? Institutions
as formalized rules—whether legal codes or organizational schemas—emerge from strategies for dealing with existing costs and
benefits in an environment, and shifts in those institutions constitute economic change. For example, in economic literature, economic change is the outcome of managerial attempts to minimize
Альманах Центра исследований
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transactions costs and improve effective and efficient coordination
(Williamson 1985; Chandler 1977). Political scientists usually add a
dimension of elite struggle for political power and profit; strategies
for institutional design are a result not only of the goal of improving efficiency and profit, but also for expanding influence (Barnes
2006; Wegren 2005; see also North 1990). Institutional change ends
up reduced to agents’ interest-centered actions without explanation of where interests come from (Friedland and Alford 1991). If
this means maneuvering to change those rules—e. g. lobbying Boris Yeltsin’s Kremlin during privatization (Barnes 2006) —then
economic change results. Problems of property rights are reduced
to bad policies or rent-seeking, rather than analyzed as clashes and
claims of different normalities. Neoclassical theory cannot conceptualize power and culture, and economists cannot examine how
change has a multidimensional nature.
While an instrumental approach gives us part of the story, it
remains unsatisfactory as the basis for a full account of economic change, especially of the radical variant that has been Russian post-socialism. In particular, an instrumental approach misses two important facets of economic practice: the source of actors’
own preferences and “tool kits” of perceptions and strategic responses (which fit under the broad heading of “knowledge”); and
emergent properties of institutional systems and actors. Thus, sociological studies of economies and organizations have challenged
assumptions about instrumental rationality that dominate mainstream economics and political science (cf. Hass 2007). In particular, the development and refinement of field theory has been important in bringing together power, culture, and institutions. Based
primarily on work of the late Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 1993, 1998),
field theory has produced important insights into the historical
structuring of economic organization and behavior (cf. DiMaggio
and Powell 1983, 1991; Fligstein 1990, 2001). However, field theory
still requires greater refinement (Martin 2012; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008), and it has been rarely applied to post-socialism. One goal of this essay is to apply rudimentary insights of field theory to Russian post-socialism —using the
theory to make better sense of the empirical case, while also using
the case to develop the theory. Field theory can help us see deeper
social dimensions to the conflict and confusion at the heart of privatization and property since 1991. And in turn, Russia’s experience can help us develop that area where field theory is currently
weak: change and conflict in field boundaries, structures, and rules1.
According to Pierre Bourdieu, social stratification is a function
of fields, habitus, and capital. Habitus is, crudely put, an individu1. This essay follows my earlier work (Hass 2011a: chapter 5; also 1997, 1999).
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al’s structured knowledge and the logic of how to use that knowledge. While habitus does not control—people are not automatons—
one’s knowledge does constrain and enable how one interprets and
responds to the world. Capital is existing resources actors can deploy. There are various forms of capital: economics (e. g. money
and property), social (quality and structure of networks), and cultural (cultural knowledge) capital are most often cited, although
other forms are conceivable. Habitus and capital are related as
strategy to resource: through experience and socialization actors
learn particular techniques for deploying what capital they have,
and existing capital can restrict or expand available strategies.
Fields are arrangements of actors—the dual metaphor is a magnetic field orienting actors in a particular way (e. g. categories and
strategies of action), and a field of battle with actors arrayed in
alliances and confrontations (Bourdieu 1990, 1998; Emirbayer and
Johnson 2008). Behavior in the field is governed by doxa, takenfor-granted rules of entry into and engagement within the field.
Capital are actors’ resources: social (e. g. networks and reputation), economic (money or shares), cultural (tastes and behavioral skills), and institutional (access to formal rules and organizations). Russia’s post-socialist doxa unraveled with radical reforms
and emergence of new agents developing new claims and acting on
new interests. Owners and oligarchs, holders of shares and money,
wanted economic capital to be triumphant. Managers preferred social capital and their variant of cultural capital (technical knowledge). State officials preferred institutional capital (the state) dominate over other forms. And naturally, all had different forms and
degrees of social capital, playing off networks with local elites, different Kremlin insiders and “clan” representatives, and alliances
with parties and other groups in an attempt to advance their claims
and conceptions of the normal doxa.
Fields are the context for strategic and collective action, and
their reconstruction should be a matter of contention. Even more
contentious is contention within and over the “master field” or
“field of power”—the specific field that, through a constellation of
material symbolic resources, has the greatest potential force to
shape general principles of practice and structure for other (e. g.
economic) fields. The battle over doxa, especially in the master
field, was linked to the battle over property and principles of control—although temporally this battle began after battles of internal enterprise control had been underway (and in many cases
were being resolved). This battle pitted managers, property owners, and state officials against each other, and sometimes property
owners versus other property owners (especially majority shareholders versus and minority, and Russian and foreign shareholders). Because property filters throughout the economy as a fundamental rule of authority, the battle between elites over high-profile,
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potentially lucrative firms (Norilsk Nikel, Iukos, aluminum firms)
set the tone for overall meaning of and claims to property. These
conspicuous cases became totems or signposts that other owners,
managers, and state officials could use for negotiating power relations and structures. Attacks on oligarchs, for example, created a
temporary panic that renationalization was imminent.
These three entities interact in Bourdieu’s framework. Field location shapes an actor’s habitus and capital, the first from experience and the second from rules of resource access. Actors internalize field rules, and resulting habitus influences how they judge and
respond to contexts (opportunities, threats, etc.)—although habitus does not overwhelm individual agency. This suggests that postsocialist economic change has not been only competing elites and
interests. Rather, it has been competing assumptions and knowledge of how a “normal” economy operates, and conflict over ritualizing and normalizing these assumptions—and primacy of particular knowledge, habitus, and capital—in organized fields of property
and governance.
C O M P E T I N G H A B I T US A N D F I E L D S LO G I C S :
A H I ST O RY O F P O ST- S O C I A L I ST E C O NO M I C C U LT U R E

Economic organization is not merely the evolutionary emergence
of efficient means for producing, trading, and making profit. Rather, economic organization is the institutionalization of norms and
logics of what constitutes a “normal” economy (Roy 1997). Actors
compete and struggle to defend and enforce what they consider to
be the ultimate meaning of economic action, which acts as a measuring rod for the status and legitimacy of economic tactics and relations. Victors in such struggle impose their versions of normality through formal laws, organizational structures and procedures,
and arrangements and rights of property ownership. In this regard, post-socialist economic change has been no different than the
emergence of capitalism or state socialism. To better understand
the post-socialist process, we must broaden our vision, beyond the
usual political economy of state and business elites and their immediate interests, to their logics of normal economic action —logics inculcated in their own biographies and manifest in personal
habitus of knowledge, strategies, and practices.
While there are multiple dimensions to logics of practice that
are then institutionalized as field doxa, I will focus on three, all
of which are related to conceptions of the normal economic order.
The first is risk: assumptions of fundamentally abnormal behavior that not only violates norms and assumptions of legitimate action, but also threatens the existence of those very norms and, by
extension, of economic entities. By positing what is risk—either
Санкт-Петербург
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through claims or through deeds—actors are also constructing in
an oblique fashion the normal economic order that is to be defended (cf. Boeva, Dolgopiatova, and Shironin 1992; Dolgopiatova and
Evseeva 1994; Gurkov and Avraamova 1995). The second dimension is the source of authority: what position, status, or skills and
knowledge are crucial to the normal operation of a normal economy. A particular vision of a normal economy presupposes a hierarchy of necessary, functional positions and knowledge. Thus, those
actors with these functional positions and knowledge are deserving of social and economic authority. The third dimension is rights
and limits of property governance. Property governance involves
normal, natural claims to resources. As such, assumptions about
fundamental rights regarding the use of property, as well as limits,
underpin models of how power or authority should be distributed
in a normal economy. Note that this does not rule out opportunistic behavior, such as claiming property rights in order to rent-seek
or guard one’s privilege. Property and governance rights are, like
any rights, claims for legitimacy. Unless it is a purely naked grab
for resources—such naked grabs are rare generally, even in postSoviet Russia—opportunism ultimately is cloaked in these claims
of normality, which in turn constrain the behavior of those who
make these assertions by making them accountable to their claims2.
I now turn to the key actors in the drama over reorganizing postSoviet fields—Red Directors, financial entrepreneurs (so-called
“oligarchs”), and state elites—and their corresponding property
empires, financial-industrial groups (finansovo-promyshlennye
gruppy, FPG)—Defensive FPGs, Financial FPGs, and State-Centered FPGs3. A summation of their logics of economic normality is
in Figure 1. The coexistence of these three types of property and
organizational principles was problematic because all three sets of
elites were fighting not only of money (investment, state money,
etc.), but also over legitimacy. Defensive FPGs were the first property empires to emerge, and Red Directors began to exercise influence over the field of power in the early 1990s, for example hindering tight budget policies and using privatization to gain further
control over their enterprises. However, as the Yeltsin regime consolidated its own power through the 1990s and made an informal
2. I not suggesting that opportunism (theft, rent-seeking, etc,) is absent or
marginal. However, I suggest that theft and opportunism are not agnostic to culture: Red Directors, oligarchs, and state elites as a rule do not
steal in any old way, just as they do not organize economic practice in any
old way. Habitus, and fields also shape knowledge and strategies available for opportunistic behavior.
3. Data and analysis for this discussion come from Hass 2011a, 2011b. See
also Johnson 1997; Prokop 1995; Starodubrovskaia 1995; Batchikov and
Petrov 1995; Gortbatova 1995; Kulikov, Latysheva, and Nikolaev 1994.
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FIGURE 1. Actors and logics (derived from Hass 2011 a: 167)
Defensive FPGs
(manager-centered)

Financial FPGs
(owner-centered)

State-centered
FPGs

Core risk

Collapse of supply,
and thus of
production

Loss of investment
and financial control

Loss of state
power over
economy

Source of
authority

Organizational
knowledge of production and labor

Property ownership,
financial knowledge

National security

Property
governance

Limited to claim on
residuals

Disposal of assets and
ultimate decisionmaking authority

Formal: use of
assets; Real:
state interests

The Firstborn: Red Directors and Defensive FPGs.

alliance with the oligarchs, the balance tipped from Red Directors
and Defensive FPGs to financial elites and Financial FPGs. Financial capitalism seemed dominate over the field of power and Russia’s economy. However, the 1998 ruble crisis shattered their seemingly inevitable domination and ushered in the return of the state,
eventually consolidated under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
Socialized and on the job in Soviet industrial enterprises in the
Soviet era, Red Directors as a rule were knowledgeable primarily about the process of production. Supply of necessary inputs, coordination of labor and provision for the labor force, and ensuring
output were key to Red Directors’ survival and success in the Soviet era. Those individuals who best played the game of using networks and maneuvering the Plan were most likely to rise to the
ranks of general directors. Long experience in the politics of production and the Plan shaped their habitus and logics and knowledge of practice. For Red Directors, the core risk to normal organization was the disruption of supply and labor—resources that
were key to production and to political legitimacy, especially because “success” in the Soviet era meant fulfilling or overfulfilling output norms and providing for the enterprise’s workers. The
source of authority for Red Directors was their organizational
knowledge and position. Atop the enterprise structure, they could
see the entire production process and apply knowledge they had
gained through experience to guarantee proper running of the enterprise, so that it could fulfill its productive function. While Red
Directors came to accept that property rights allowed claims to residuals (i. e. profit), it did not allow total interference within the
enterprise if such interference would hinder production and employee provision. Red Directors often articulated a “moral economy” of the enterprise as a sacred collective that could not be hurt
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by the mere pursuit of profit, because such naked pursuit was little different from rent-seeking and theft (Hass 2011 b).
Natural variation aside, the general logic of the generic Red Director habitus—generated by long-time experience in the Soviet
era and thus reflected Soviet logics of everyday economic life—was
institutionalized in interorganizational relations, and later through
property ties, in the Defensive FPG. The fundamental logic to this
structure was interlocking property relations that defended firms
against outside control or accountability, and against uncertainty of supply and finance by solidifying supply relations and literally by pooling and distributing funds for support, as in a mutual
aid society. Exchange partners needed to group together to support exchange and supply of goods linked in production cycles, and
so this FPG emerged as a safety net embodying production logics and relations. Thus, Defensive FPGs often began as voluntary
associations in the late 1980s of enterprises that had produced for
each other or made similar products and were often enough in
the same ministry or glavk. Older directors used to state-centered
planning saw risk in collapsing exchange and distribution, finances, and unsettled rules of the new economic order. After one interview I conducted in 1995, a manager of a chemical FPG in St.
Petersburg mentioned heatedly criticized bankers and Financial
FPGs as bloodsuckers who drained Russia’s wealth and cared little about production, educating a new generation of chemists and
engineers, and maintaining Russia’s competitive edge in chemical
production and research. The head of a local Petersburg furniture
FPG intimated the same. When I asked about pursuing outside investment, perhaps by entering a Financial FPG—dominant in 1997,
when the interview took place—he responded quickly and forcefully that he did not trust “bankers,” who, he claimed, bought enterprises only to squeeze them dry and discard them.
To build a Defensive FPG, participating firms created a central
holding company—sometimes some kind of financial institution—
to which they turned over shares. (Defensive FPGs usually had an
associated bank as well, for attracting private investment or funneling state subsidies or other funds.) Holding company shares
were then split among FPG members, whose directors sat on the
FPG board of directors. In this way the FPG would defend managerial autonomy and enterprise security. Comments by the director of a Petersburg bread factory are instructive. Former Party
and state-ministerial elites actively aided creating some Defensive
FPGs, using networks and the ministerial template (Prokop 1995;
Gorbatova 1995, Starodubrovskaia 1995). Defensive FPG Fin Prom
was created by a coalition of local state officials, enterprise managers, and the State Privatization Committee; mining companies,
real estate firms, a bank, trading company. FPG Konsensus was
formed from the Soviet Ministry of Light Industry. Petersburg’s
Альманах Центра исследований
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Energomashstroitel’naia Korporatsiia (EMK), originally MGO Energomash, was founded on a former state structure and sector. The
raison d’être was to reorganize inter-enterprise relations in the
economic crisis and privatization.
The institutionalization of Red Directors’ status and habitus in
Defensive FPGs was the first manifestation of post-socialist economic culture, because Red Directors were best situated and had
the best capital early on to benefit from the collapse of Soviet socialism. They did not have to “emerge” as financial elites and oligarchs did, nor were they initially attacked and delgitimated as
were state officials and state-held property. However, the manager-centered and production-centered logic of the Red Director
habitus and the Defensive FPG faced several potential problems.
First, they did not fit so well with the emerging “transition culture”
(Kennedy 2002) that favored finance over production and that posited “Soviet” and “socialist” (which Red Directors were) as illegitimate and abnormal. Second, while some Defensive FPGs could
earn profits from sales of some products (e. g. exports of electricity generating equipment) or temporarily attracting capital to the
FPG’s financial institution, Defensive FPGs did not always follow
sufficiently fundamental restructuring or generate sufficient capital
to develop in the post-socialist world, leaving them at an eventual
disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors. Third, once Defensive FPGs
had been created, it was possible for a director of the central financial organization to turn the tables on its founders and gain control over the members of that particular Defensive FPGs. Exactly
this happened in the late 1990s to Energomash (EMK)4. Aleksandr
Stepanov attempted to use various financial machinations to gain
personal control over the members of EMK. While this violated a
core principle of the Defensive FPG—to guard the autonomy of
the member companies—Stepanov was initially successful. However, the principle of autonomy eventually generated resistance,
especially from Stepanov’s eventual target, Leningradskii Metallicheskii Zavod (LMZ). After a protracted battle in various courts,
LMZ, Elektrosila, and allies defeated Stepanov and EMK, depriving EMK of core companies.
Finally, the status of Red Directors and Defensive FPGs would
wane because, at the center of the field of power—the Kremlin
(which had not yet devolved that much real institutional power) —
the managerial clan had lost the battle of the clans in the mid1990s. Instead, a new clan representing an emerging financial elite
had gained influence within the Kremlin and Yeltsin’s inner circle (Hoffman 2002). The state began to favor this new elite and its
habitus and logics of fields and organization. The time had come
4. For an analysis of internal conflict at EMK, see Hass (2011 a: chapter 5).
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T E M P O RA RY CA P I TA L I ST H E G E M O N S :
O L I GA R C H S A N D F I NA N C I A L F P G S

The second set of actors was financial entrepreneurs, especially
those who became the superrich “oligarchs.” Financial entrepreneurs often came from the ranks of the Komsomol, research institutes, or similar bodies, in which knowledge of production was less
important than other knowledge, in particular manipulating access
to financial and similar resources (dues, funds for research projects,
etc.). Outside the managerial hierarchy in the late Soviet era, some
Komsomol leaders and institute employees saw opportunity for
speculative profits during Gorbachev’s reforms—where their managerial bosses saw the repetition of an earlier pattern of talk about
reform ultimately failing to reach fruition (Hoffman 2002). Whether using access to hard currency to initiate import and resale trade
for profit, or setting up early financial institutions, these younger
financial wizards learned how to work in the shadows and on the
margins of the slowly liberalizing and unraveling late Soviet economy. Their experience was in organizing resources; organizations
were less about production than about procedures and capital. As
these younger entrepreneurs turned to speculative trading in the
late 1980s, they conceived a core risk as losing control over capital
and the return of investment. Their conception of authority was
grounded in knowledge and control of resources, especially money.
Finally, property was the rights not only to profits and principal
of investment, but also decision-making authority stemming from
the provision of capital. In short, financial entrepreneurs were the
closest thing to nascent capitalists in post-Soviet Russia. To managers of banks and Financial FPGs, enterprises were commodities
to be bought and sold (via shares) through market means. Not the
enterprise itself, but capital and shareholding were sacred.
Financial entrepreneurs’ (Khodorkovskii, Berezovskii et al.)
experience of making money in the Komsomol or trading deficit goods extended into Financial FPGs. After 1992 major commercial banks expanded beyond financial games with currency
and treasury bills (GKOs, OFZs) to acquiring shares in privatized
firms. Oneksimbank and finance company Mikrodin united as Interros and acquired shares by various means in such privatized
enterprises as Norilsk Nickel or Moscow car factory ZiL (later
saved by Mayor Iurii Luzhkov). Menatep, Al’fa-bank, and Inkombank invested in oil, confectioneries, and metals. Komsomol experience gave these elites skills to manipulate finances and rules
and use loose laws for gain; they could also apply market vocabАльманах Центра исследований
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ulary to engage Western investors. They had sufficient capital
to interest the cash-strapped state, and they had as allies some
Kremlin insiders who came less from nomenklatura than from the
Komsomol or other institutes. These entrepreneurs and organizations built empires by obtaining shares through privatization
auctions and the secondary market through a variety of means,
usually indirect and difficult to trace formally. Because they conceived of risk primarily in terms of control of and return on investment, i. e. property ownership and governance, their property empires differed in two ways from Defensive FPGs. First,
this elite made sure to have a presence on boards of directors and
managers in their newly-acquired properties. As Menatep president A. Zurabov noted, “in Russia it is still impossible to make
financial investments without real control over the debtor… If
we control management, the situation, capital streams, account
transactions, and the like, then of course the probability of a return of such loans in order are higher than loans by a clientele
on the side…” (Pappe et al 1997:52). Second, unlike Defensive
FPGs—where risk was equated with losing control of exchange
and supply or losing subsidies—Financial FPGs were organized
around the principle of diversification—spreading risk around. As
one manager at FPG Sokol noted, “we operate on the principle of
the submarine, where there are several compartments—this helps
keep it afloat during difficult times when one compartment is suffering” (Ekonomika i zhizn’ #33 1994: 37). Menatep invested in
firms organized around exports to gain control of those hard-currency accounts—but this also left Menatep with diverse holdings
(even if oil was an important part of the Menatep empire). Bank
Rossiiskii Kredit began buying shares to engage in speculation,
but ultimately the bank found it had a diversified empire.
Financial elites and their FPGs were temporary hegemons after the 1995 loans-for-shares (zalogovaia privatizatsiia) auctions,
which were rigged in their favor. Upon gaining controlling packets
of shares, the financial elite moved to consolidate governance. This
was not so easy at the start. The test case for oligarch power was
the battle for control over Norilsk Nickel, which pitted new owners
Oneximbank against entrenched managers. After a long struggle
through various courts, Oneximbank emerged victorious. Khodorkovskii also faced resistance from managers within his newly acquired Iukos oil empire. Only by using various machinations with
share offerings did Khdorkovskii consolidate his control over that
empire. As the 1990s wore on, it became clear that the financial
elites had Yeltsin on their side, and that they could play the new
formal laws of Yeltsin’s regime and the broader logics of emerging
Russian capitalism. Thus, after 1995 the Financial FPG and financial elite eclipsed the Defensive FPG and Red Directors for hegemony over Russia’s economy. However, the story was not yet over.
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In 1998 the oligarchs and Yeltsin’s Kremlin were seriously wounded by the ruble crisis. Not only did many oligarchs and Financial
FPGs lose capital in the crisis; they also lost the halo of inevitable
ascendance. Suddenly they seemed not only the prime villains behind inequality and crisis in Russia; they also seemed vulnerable.
The crisis hurt Yeltsin’s image and emboldened his political opponents. Eventually, Yeltsin turned over the reigns of power to a previously badly-known state operative everyone presumed would follow the whims of the oligarchs. It turned out Vladimir Putin had
other plans, and he had tools to realize them in the face of oligarch
opposition. The stage was set for, yet again, a transfer of hegemony to another elite and another set of principles for the organization of property and fields.
T H E W I N N E R S T H US FA R :
STAT E E L I T E S A N D STAT E - C E N T E R E D F P G S

A third “class” and logic of economic organization was ever-present but in the 1990s latent: state elites and officials—especially the
siloviki, elite from the security apparatus—and a dirigiste logic of
organization. In the 1990s on its contours were somewhat blurry.
State elites were often outmaneuvered or co-opted by Red Directors and later by financiers. The latent logic of state-centered elites
and organization centered on state authority and security; production and profit were secondary to the prerogative of the state
and the security and prestige of the nation for which state officials
spoke. Correspondingly, the main risk was loss of state influence
(but not necessarily ownership) over economic activity. The converse was that authority was linked to state and national security: Russia was not unique in that the raison d’etre of the state was
security and control, but this logic was stronger in Russia than in
most other European states. Finally, the logic of property and governance was shifting in the post-Soviet period. Total state ownership and control of the economy had proven disastrous; however,
state control of or influence over sectors crucial to national security was not so odious. Majority share ownership was no worse
than total ownership, and in fact brought a benefit: minority shareholders could be persuaded to invest in modernization in return to
a portion of future profits (although without much say in the running of these companies).
Privatization and liberalization meant the state was withdrawing from the economy. Only a few giants stood in the arena: railways monopoly Rossiiskaia Zheleznaia Doroga (RZhD), electricity monopoly Edinaia Elektrichestkaia Sistema (EES), and natural
gas monopoly Gazprom. Gazprom had survived the fate of the oil
sector, where the state monopoly was broken up and its pieces priАльманах Центра исследований
экономической культуры

vatized5. This structure, along with its control over potentially lucrative national gas, made this a potentially important vehicle for
the exercise of state power. In particular, Gazprom and Gazpropmbank were a key part of Putin’s strategy of subordinating the oligarchs to the state—once Putin had ousted Rem Viakhirev from
Gazprom and installed Aleksei Miller as director. Putin’s attack
on his competitors was two-pronged. First, he used Gazprom’s
wealth and some debts Gazprom or Gazpropmbank held over some
oligarchs’ holdings to gain control over the media—in particular,
Gusinskii’s media empire. The second prong was to use kompromat against recalcitrant oligarchs—to put them in jail (Khodorkovskii), to force them to turn over their property and flee the country (Gusinskii, Berezovskii), or to keep quiet and toe the Kremlin’s
line (other oligarchs)6. By 2004, state-owned giants Gazprom and
Rosneft were the main instruments of state power—initially used
to take over oligarch property, and then to redistribute hydrocarbon wealth to increase dependency on the state.
Eventually, this model of post-socialist dirigisme spread in
the creation of new goskorporatsii. OAK and OSK are two familiar state corporations, but one of the more interesting has been
Rossiiskaia Tekhnologiia. Rostekhnologiia, headed by Putin contact Sergei Chemezov, was an attempt to reunite heavy industry
and “strategically important” companies and sectors under state
control once again. One purpose for creating Rostekhnologiia was
to guard underdeveloped, unreconstructured, and vulnerable Russian industries from market competition, especially foreign competition (Hass 2011 b). While these state-centered FPGs have, like
Defensive FPGs, helped defend production, they have not focused
primarily on defending supply or managerial authority: manages
are subordinate to the state, and production is framed in terms of
state or national importance rather than as important for its own
sake (the Soviet logic of Defensive FPGs). And while state-centered FPGs have not focused primarily on a “bottom line” of profit as was the case for Financial FPGs, profit and share ownership
are not unimportant. Member companies in state-centered FPGs
are state-owned precisely because the state owns a majority of
shares—which the state could sell if need be. One tactic has been
to sell minority groups of shares to foreign investors, to raise capital in return for longer-term access to a percentage of profits (but
not of ultimate decision-making authority). Thus, while the new
5. Technically, Gazprom was reorganized into many daughter firms, but in
reality these remained under centralized control by Rem Viakhirev.
6. For sake of space, I will not go into detail over the politics and strategies
Putin and siloviki pursued to subdue the oligarchs and augment state power. These general events are well-known to the readership of this volume,
and I recount these details elsewhere (Hass 2011 a, 2011 b).
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state-centered FPG and its field logic is not en embrace of capitalism, neither is it a return to the Soviet logic of economic culture and fields.
C O N C LUS I O N :
E C O NO M I C C U LT U R E , H A B I T US A N D F I E L D S , A N D
P O ST- S O C I A L I SM

In this essay I have tried to show that one cannot understand the
broader picture and deeper processes of post-socialism change only
by focusing on efficiency, markets, or state and elite interests—as
economists and political scientists usually do. Rather, economic
culture plays an important role in post-Soviet economic change.
However, that economic culture does not exist in some disembodied, free-floating, vague and amorphous form. Rather, economic
culture is related to authority, and it operates through individual actors who reproduce economic structures through their practices (as driven by habitus), and through the institutionalization
of habitus and culture through the organization of property and
formulation of risk and authority in FPGs and fields. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim all saw culture operating (although in different ways) through collective expressions and social processes and
forms. Where we see collective practices, institutions, and organizations, we are seeing culture. And in recent years, the story of
post-Soviet property has been not only a story of elite interests, intrigues, and power—it has also been the drama of competing forms
and content of economic culture and the battle over which meanings would dominate the post-socialist landscape. And one thing is
certain: this drama is not yet over. Red Directors seemed in charge
initially once they emasculated shock therapy; oligarchs seemed in
charge after privatization. To assume siloviki and their dirigisme
are eternal would be foolish as well. For is history teaches us one
thing, it is that culture is ever-changing—even in economies.
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